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ABSTRACT Data are becoming the cornerstone of many businesses and entire systems infrastructure.
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are no different. The ability of intelligent vehicles and devices to
acquire and share environmental measurements in the form of data is leading to the creation of smart services
for the benefit of individuals. In this paper, we present a system architecture to promote the development
of ITS using distributed ledgers and related technologies. Thanks to these, it becomes possible to create,
store and share data generated by users through the sensors on their devices or vehicles, while on the
move. We propose an architecture based on Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) to offer features such
as immutability, traceability and verifiability of data. IOTA, a promising DLT for IoT, is used together
with Decentralized File Storages (DFSes) to store and certify data (and their related metadata) coming
from vehicles or by the users’ devices themselves (smartphones). Ethereum is then exploited as the smart
contract platform that coordinates the data sharing through access control mechanisms. Privacy guarantees
are provided by the usage of distributed key management systems and Zero Knowledge Proof. We provide
experimental results of a testbed based on real traces, in order to understand if DLT and DFS technologies
are ready to support complex services, such as those that pertain to ITS. Results clearly show that, while
the viability of the proposal cannot be rejected, further work is needed on the responsiveness of DLT
infrastructures.
INDEX TERMS Intelligent transportation systems, distributed ledger technologies, blockchain, smart
contracts, decentralized file storage, sensing as a service.
I. INTRODUCTION
The future of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) will be
based on the ability of vehicles to sense, store and exchange
big data. Vehicles will be more and more equipped with
sensors that track information about the vehicle internals,
as well as information about the surrounding environment and
road conditions. Moreover, ubiquitous connectivity allows
individuals to post crowdsensed information through their
smartphones and mobile devices. This makes them become
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yanli Xu .
an active part of ITS. Such crowd-sensed information is
essential for building sophisticated smart services that aim
at improving traffic management, transportation efficiency
and safety, raising awareness about the environment, and thus
improving the liveability and health status of the community
of a given territory. We thus envisage that vehicles and their
users will be able to record data, store them in some data
boxes, and communicate with other vehicles or users as well.
There are numerous examples of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) based applications, such
as notification services [1], [2], as well as standards for
communication messages, e.g., ETSI Cooperative Awareness
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Messages (CAM) [3]. In these contexts, one of the main
issues is the unreliability of the exchanged information. This
problem is typically due to the physical errors of the sensors,
malfunctions, poor network and GPS coverage. Such noised
data lead to inaccurate information. Another problem is due
to the fact that some users might be interested in deliber-
ately transferring forged information. Examples are insurance
frauds, as well as free-riders that decide to share false data,
randomly generated without using their sensors, in order to
gain some revenues/credits for such fake data sharing. Thus,
a main goal to pursue is the identification of strategies for
the generation and distribution of secure and trustful crowd-
sourced information.
Meanwhile, different initiatives are growing with the aim
of enhancing mobility services (e.g. MOBI [4]). Among
these, some focus on frameworks for sharing mobility data
provided by users [5]. These solutions typically resort to
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) and other related
mechanisms. The rationale behind this choice is the need for
trustful data trading and sharing, allowing anyone to verify
the authenticity and the immutability of information (see
Figure 1).
DLTs can be seen as the evolution of the well known
blockchain, which gathered momentum after the sudden
increase of Bitcoin demand [6], and after the introduction of
the Ethereum decentralized platform, featuring smart contract
functionalities [7], [8]. The appeal of these technologies
is mainly due to the fact that they avoid the possibility
of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference.
This led additional interest on researchers that then intro-
ducedmore advanced DLTs, distributed data storage systems,
as well as security and cryptography schemes for verifi-
able encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, and data secrecy
[9]–[11]. These technologies can be proficiently employed
in several application domains [12]–[15], as well as ITS
scenarios [1], [16]–[18].
The ‘‘intelligent’’ word, in ITS, means that data generated
by users’ smartphones, vehicles’ sensors or IoT devices,
are transformed into new meaningful information useful for
individuals and the ecosystem itself. Hence, one of the main
issues is to provide means to easily publish data, while
granting compliance with the (related) individuals’ privacy
preferences and regulations, e.g. the EU GDPR [19]. We
think that the use of non-centralized technologies can inhibit
the tendency to transfer data in the hands of few entities,
that often operate without transparency. Rather, decentralized
architectures might promote individuals’ data sovereignty
and the possibility of the creation of fair data marketplaces.
Indeed, any individual in the ITS can share data coming from
his vehicle or his personal device (e.g. smartphone) becoming
a data provider. Subsequently, anyone else can access these
data, with permissions granted following an agreement and
thus becoming a data consumer (see Figure 2).
In this paper, we describe a decentralized software archi-
tecture that fulfils the mentioned ‘‘desiderata’’. In our archi-
tecture, data sharing services are defined to let users and IoT
FIGURE 1. Transportation systems: desiderata, features and technologies.
FIGURE 2. Data life cycle: data owners get data from their sensors to
provide these to data consumers through the use of DLTs and smart
contracts; consumers are then able to generate new data or to provide
smart services accessible by individuals such as data owners.
sensors to share their data. These services permit to define
how data can be shared, but also how data are acquired. The
proposed infrastructure is based on DLTs, in combination
with other technologies for Decentralized File Storage (DFS),
i.e. IPFS [9] and Sia [20]. Access to crowd-sensed data is
regulated through smart contracts, that implement a control
list and provide access only to authorized users.
We developed a software architecture where vehicles gen-
erate data (e.g. obtained through sensors) that are stored and
shared thanks to the combined use of IOTA [21] and a DFS.
Ethereum smart contracts provide the coordination among
entities. Thus, smart contracts allow gaining access to specific
data of interest, once the user has the authorization to access
the data (e.g. by paying for such access authorization). Autho-
rization for data access is achieved through a distributed key
management system. Moreover, Zero Knowledge Proof is
employed as the scheme to offer privacy while providing
proof-of-location guarantees. The developed proof of con-
cept implementation demonstrates the viability of the devised
solution and it is freely available on GitHub [22], [23].
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After defining the architecture, it was important to assess
its performance as a whole and for each building block. For
this reason, we conducted a detailed performance evaluation,
focusing explicitly on the use of the distributed technologies
for data sharing. Indeed, in the proposed architecture the
data publication is one of the most time-critical parts of
the data life cycle. On this aspect, is it worth noticing that
the DLT technologies are in its infancy and it is necessary to
investigate the viability of their adoption and their scalability.
Furthermore, several approaches can be pursued for storing
data in DFS.
To sum up, the main contribution of this paper is threefold:
• We propose a layered, decentralized software architec-
ture for the development of novel services for ITS.
To this aim, the architecture makes use of novel decen-
tralized technologies, such as DLT, DFS, smart con-
tracts, proof-of-location and sophisticated authorization
schemes. We claim that this choice promotes individu-
als’ data sovereignty.
• We describe the implementation of a prototype system
architecture. In particular, we used IOTA and its MAM
channels as the main DLT to store transactions in the
ledger; Ethereum as the platform to implement and exe-
cute smart contracts that govern data access; IPFS and
Sia as the DFS to store large data files; secret sharing
as the main scheme to implement the authorization ser-
vice; we employ proof-of-location as an exemplar of
certificate that provides trust of data; we developed a
payment system that allows trading data for fungible
(ERC-20) tokens in novel ITS smart services, based
on the µRaiden framework [22], [23]. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes an
integrated use of all these technologies.
• We provide experimental results of a real testbed eval-
uation of the most critical aspects of the implemented
software architecture, so as to understand the viability
on the use of the current available technologies for ITS.
In particular, through a trace-driven simulation, in our
tests we generated a data traffic mimicking a fleet of
buses, traveling in Rio de Janerio, that periodically sense
data and send them to the system infrastructure. Such
data traffic was submitted to the IOTA DLT and the
employed DFS, under different real setups. Outcomes
demonstrate that, while the system architecture and its
components are very promising, work has to be made in
order to make decentralized technologies more respon-
sive and scalable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces some background and related work.
Section III presents the proposed distributed software archi-
tecture. Section IV discusses a use case based on the devel-
opment of a data marketplace. Section V describes the
design of the experimental evaluation we conducted and
the obtained results. Section VI provides a discussion on the
obtained results. Finally, Section VII provides some conclud-
ing remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the main background concepts
and technologies that are needed to present the proposed
decentralized software architecture. We also review some of
the main related works in the literature.
A. BACKGROUND
The key building blocks at the basis of our system architecture
are VANETs, DLTs, DFSes and encryption techniques. In the
rest of this subsection, we provide some related background
for each of these main topics.
1) VANETs
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) are a decentralized
type of networks among vehicles, usually considered as
the reference use case for ITS. VANETs allow vehicles to
form a peer-to-peer substrate to share information and for
the creation of smart mobility applications [17], [24]. The
term VANET was originally introduced as the vehicular-
based specification of general Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(MANETs). Thus, the focus was in particular, on the ad-hoc
construction of an overlay network among cars. However,
today VANET is mostly considered as a synonym of the more
generic term ‘‘vehicular network’’.
VANETs are thus networks of vehicles, representing net-
work nodes. VANETs exploit wireless communications,
forming a landscape where vehicles can communicate
between each other (V2V), with some fixed on-road equip-
ment (V2X) or with the transport infrastructure (V2I).
In order to participate to the VANET, each vehicle can be
equipped with two components: an Application Unit (AU)
and an On Board Unit (OBU). The AU stores an application
software, that uses communication and sensing services pro-
vided by the OBU. Vehicles can communicate to the Internet
by means of a Road Side Unit (RSU), that can be seen as a
gateway to the wired network infrastructure, but they can also
offer different kinds of services. Indeed, RSUs typically host
applications that provide services, while OBUs and AUs are
devices that use the provided services.
2) DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES
ADistributed Ledger Technology (DLT) is a technical imple-
mentation of a data ledger, thought with the aim to move
trust from a human intermediary, that manages a transac-
tion between two parties, to a protocol that allows the two
parties to transact directly, i.e. without the need of a third
party [17]. The ledger ensures immutable persistence of
data, thus providing untampered data to applications when
it is necessary. For this reason, DLTs represent an appealing
technology for the development of trustful and reliable ITS
services [17], [18].
There are different implementations of DLTs, each one
with its pros and cons. First, they can be subdivided in
two main categories: i) permissionless, i.e. anyone can
have access to the peers’ network and to participate in the
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consensus mechanism, and ii) permissioned, i.e. access are
ruled through a hierarchy of participants. Hyperledger Fabric
is an example of permissioned DLT [25]. The permissioned
approach can be very convenient in many situations, and this
solution eases the composition of a software architecture.
However, in order to use a permissioned DLT, a consortium
of trusted entities is needed. These entities usually act as
certificate authorities that release public and private keys to
access the ledger [26]. Obviously, such a solution requires
to trust such consortium [27]. In contrast, we think that a
permissionless approach, such as Ethereum and IOTA DLTs,
is more suitable to let every individual share his data and
enjoy services. For this reason, in this work we focus on
permissionless DLTs, and we propose a solution that avoids
trusting a centralized governance.
Another main distinction among DLTs lies on their pos-
sible support to smart contracts. This feature is quite often
in contrast with other key features, related to the level of
scalability and responsiveness. For example, Ethereum [7]
provides a distributed virtual machine able to process any
kind of computation through smart contracts. However, it is
well known such blockchain has some scalability issues [28].
Conversely, the IOTA ledger [21] is thought to provide better
scalability, but it currently does not support smart contracts.
Trying to sum up, if one looks at the solutions that are
available at the time of writing, there is no single, operative
and fully fledged solution that is able to cover all the features
that are needed (and reported in Figure 1). Thus, we claim that
in order to build a sophisticated software architecture, that
is able to act as the middleware for secure and certified ITS
applications, multiple DLTs need be utilized and combined
together, so as to take the best of multiple worlds. This is the
philosophy we followed in our approach.
a: SMART CONTRACTS AND PAYMENT CHANNELS
Smart contracts provide a new paradigm where an immutable
set of instructions is deterministically executed during a trans-
action between two parts. Without the presence of a third
party, the execution of a smart contract is performed in such a
way that a contract issuer can always be sure that the behavior
he implemented is observed. In the case of Ethereum, every
process is completely traced and permanently stored in the
blockchain.Moreover, the smart-contract computation is exe-
cuted by all network participants.
Since transactions in smart contracts and blockchains can
be expensive in terms of fees and latencies, payment channels
have been introduced to implement rapid micropayments. We
can distinguish between on-chain and off-chain payments.
On-chain payments can be made, for instance, through smart
contracts implementing ERC20-like tokens and cryptocur-
rencies [29]. Off-chain payments, on the other hand, allow
users to perform multiple payments, with the advantage that
only the first and the last payment transactions are stored
into the ledger. To guarantee the payment security, off-chain
payments are regulated through smart contracts (or scripts in
the case of Bitcoin), that manage the so called state chan-
nel. The most well known examples of off-chain payment
schemes are the Bitcoin’s Lightning Network [30] and the
Ethereum’s Raiden Network [31]. The main advantage of this
approach is the limited amount of fees that are usually paid,
since the majority of the transactions are not registered in
the blockchain. Another effect of this approach is the faster
confirmation of transactions.
More in detail, the typical approach followed to implement
micropayments has three simple steps: i) a user (sender) that
is willing to pay a provider (receiver) for a service opens a
channel through a dedicated smart contract, depositing the
amount of currency that can be possibly transferred in that
channel; ii) both sender and receiver communicate using an
off-chain channel, in order to update the balance; iii) sender
and receiver can close the channel by invoking the smart
contract and submitting the last agreed balance message and
the other party signature. Then, the balance and the remaining
deposit will be moved to their accounts.
b: IOTA
IOTA is a permissionless DLT that allows hosts in a network
to transfer immutable data among each other. It is specifically
designed for the IoT industry. The ledger used in IOTA is not
structured as a blockchain but as a Direct Acyclical Graph
(DAG) called the Tangle [21]. In the IOTA DAG, the graph
vertices represent transactions and edges represent approvals.
When a new transaction is issued, it must approve the two
previous transactions and the result is represented by means
of directed edges. The process of attaching a transaction to
the Tangle includes two sub-processes:
• Tips selection - To attach a transaction to the Tangle,
it is mandatory to reference two previous transactions
called tips, i.e. transactions that do not have a successor
yet. These tips are provided by the IOTA full node that
stores the full graph and are selected using a Markov
Chain Monte Carlo algorithm.
• Proof-of-Work (PoW) - This step consists in validating
a transaction by performing a PoW i.e. a crypto-puzzle
computation. Such puzzle consists in making some
(costly and time-consuming) computation, in order to
obtain a piece of data which satisfies certain require-
ments. A main characteristics is that the result of the
puzzle is difficult to find, but it is easy to verify, once
revealed. The purpose of PoW is to deter denial of
service attacks and other service abuses (e.g. the 50%
+ 1 attack).
The validation approach is thought to address two major
issues of traditional blockchain-based DLTs, i.e. latency and
fees. IOTA has been designed to offer fast validation, and
no fees are required to add a transaction to the Tangle [10].
The IOTA design makes it an appealing choice, that in our
opinion deserves experimental studies, so as to understand
if it can support smart services built through crowd-sourced
data. However, we point out that currently a ‘‘coordinator
node’’ is used in the system. Such central node, maintained
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by the IOTA foundation, has the task to perform a periodic
checkpointing of the ledger, i.e. releasing milestone trans-
actions that confirm that all the previous ones are valid.
The rationale is that the coordinator should sustain possible
large-scale security attacks, during the first period of the
deployment of this DLT. Indeed, as shown after the ‘‘Trinity
wallet attack’’ at the start of 2020 [32], the IOTA foundation
has the complete ability to shut down the network, simply
by halting the coordinator. Clearly enough, this is a big issue
that needs to be addressed, for an effective IOTA deployment
and in order to foresee a widespread adoption of this technol-
ogy [33].
An important feature offered by IOTA is the Masked
Authenticated Messaging (MAM). MAM is a data commu-
nication protocol built upon the Tangle, which adds the func-
tionality to emit and access an encrypted data stream over
the Tangle. Data streams assume the form of channels, i.e. a
linked list of ordered transactions. Once a channel is created,
only the channel owner can publish encrypted messages on
it. Users that possess the MAM channel encryption key (or
set of keys, since each message can be encrypted using a
different key) are enabled to decode the message. Messages
are pushed on the channel in chronological order, and each
message has a link to the next message to be created. Thus,
once a user gains access to the MAM channel, he is enabled
to see data from that moment on, whilst he cannot look back
through the history of the channel before his entrance. In other
words, MAM enables users to subscribe and follow a stream
of data, generated by some device. Our architecture makes an
extensive use of this feature.
3) DECENTRALIZED FILE STORAGE (DFS)
Decentralized file storage is a potential solution for main-
taining files in a system without having to rely on a large,
centralized silos that may not completely assure privacy and
freedom of information. Such technologies are fundamental
for DLTs, since these can be used when the ledger and the
consensus mechanism disincentives data storing.
a: IPFS
The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [9] is a protocol that
builds a distributed file system over a peer-to-peer network.
IPFS creates a resilient file storage and sharing system, with
no single point of failure and in which the nodes do not need
to trust each other. This technology is useful to store data that
is not convenient to put on DLTs.
Files published in the IPFS network take the form of IPFS
objects. In order to retrieve an object, only the file digest is
needed, i.e. the result of an hash function applied on the file.
Put in other words, the file digest is the identifier of the IPFS
object. Users that want to locate that object use this identifier
as an handle.
It is important to mention that, when there is no incentive
to maintain files, IPFS does not offer guarantees on the
persistence of data in the storage system. It stores data as
long as some IPFS node maintains a replica of that file.
The more the nodes that maintain a copy of a given file,
the higher the reliability and the higher the guarantees that
the file can be properly retrieved. However, incentivation
mechanisms can be employed to obtain that the distributed
system permanently stores files, i.e. users can reward nodes
that maintain a copy of their data.
b: INCENTIVIZED SOLUTIONS FOR PERSISTENCE
In order to provide incentives to nodes for maintaining
data, some DFSes integrate DLTs, bringing together clients’
requests with storage nodes’ offers. Filecoin is the typical
incentive used on top of IPFS [34]. In practice, participants
are rewarded (with Filecoin tokens) for serving and hosting
content on their storage. Thus, this strategy does not alter the
protocol on how nodes exchange data files. Simply, certain
IPFS nodes are paid to store and not erase them.
Besides Filecoin, which is the most showcased solution
[35], other solutions exist that provide incentives to persis-
tently store data [20], [36], [37]. For instance, Sia [20] is
a DFS that, similarly to Filecoin, integrates a blockchain in
order to reward hosts for keeping files. It uses File Contracts,
i.e. a particular kind of smart contract employed to arrange an
agreement between a storage provider and their clients.While
interesting, it is worth mentioning that at the time of writing
Sia lacks the simplicity and the level of maturity provided by
IPFS. Probably for this reason, current solutions in literature
are mostly based on IPFS [38]–[40].
4) CRYPTOGRAPHY TECHNIQUES
The distributed technologies, used for providing smart mobil-
ity solutions, are based on DLTs and DFSes. According to
these schemes, data is usually public and, therefore, can be
accessed by any participant. In certain application scenarios,
this can represent a issue. To mitigate this possible problem,
in this section we mention some sophisticated cryptographic
techniques that allow providing privacy to users.
ZeroKnowledge Proof [41] is a protocol inwhich one party
(called Prover) can prove to another party (called Verifier)
that he knows a value x without giving any information except
the fact that he knows x (i.e. without disclosing the x value).
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) [42] is a cryptographic prim-
itive, where an untrusted proxy can translate a message m,
encrypted with a key k1, into a cipher text with key k2, without
being able to see the plain text. This is possible using a re-
encryption key rk generated by the user who owns k1.
Secret sharing, firstly proposed by Shamir in 1979 [43],
consists in a method used to distribute a secret amongst a
group of n participants, where any group of t (with t ≤
n) or more of them can together reconstruct the secret, but
no group fewer than t in number can. Such scheme is called
(t, n)-threshold. Multiple servers form an overlay network;
all servers store secrets, shares and provide them to data
consumer. This improves user’s data privacy, since none of
the servers can obtain the whole secret used for encryption
without the help of other t − 1 servers.
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B. RELATED WORK
DLTs have been recently adopted in several contexts, such as
IoT [44], [45], smart cities [46], [47] and ITS [26], [48]. The
main reason is due to their ability to enable public verifiability
of digital transactions and data.
In [49], Yuan and Wang conduct a preliminary study of
blockchain based ITS, giving the basis for a new ITS-oriented
blockchain model. In this work, the focus is on the blockchain
potential to help establishing a secured, trusted and decen-
tralized ecosystem. Leiding et al. [16] present CHORUS
Mobility, a decentralized system that combines VANETs and
Ethereum to provide services and enforce rules in ITS [50].
Sharma et al. [51] show various use cases in order to validate
blockchain based applications for social good.
In environments such as ITS, where data sharing is fun-
damental, how the data are obtained is a crucial task, that
might require a change of paradigms and employed technolo-
gies. Chiasserini et al. [1] propose an architecture to validate
the information contained in CAMs and provide a tamper-
evident and distributed data storage, using DLTs and smart
contracts.
Various works in the literature share the main goal we pur-
sue in this paper, i.e. the proposal of a blockchain-based archi-
tecture for data management [52], [53]. However, the focus
was usually limited in certain aspects of the general prob-
lem. Focusing on data trading, a basis for a marketplace
is needed. Works such as [54], [55] propose the of use a
blockchain to trade data in IoT and smart cities scenarios.
López and Farooq [56] build a framework on top of Hyper-
ledger Fabric, where participants can share their encrypted
smart mobility data. While maintaining similar features, our
solution is completely based on permissionless technologies.
Zhang et al. [57] design a blockchain-based architecture for
data sharing, with attribute-based access control. They use
Ethereum smart contracts to grant data access, which are
integrated with an attribute encryption scheme [58]. In [59],
the authors make use of IOTA andmicropayments for stream-
ing data with payment processing and auditable records in a
IoT scenario.
The use of IOTA in transportation systems is becoming
relevant. In fact, it seems that more and more companies are
starting to appreciate its potential [60]. Overko et al. [61]
present a distributed reinforcement learning system based on
IOTA to determine an unknown distribution of traffic patterns
in a city. The limitations and potential impact of IOTA in ITS
are also studied by Bartolomeu et al. in [62]. They propose
the use of this DLT to improve the security of both in-vehicle
and off-vehicle functions.
Finally, there are other related works, whose applications
are not related to ITS, but which share some similarities in
terms of the exploited underlying technologies [38], [63].
Among them, Wang et al. [40] provide a data sharing frame-
work based on attribute-based encryption, where Ethereum
smart contracts are combined to IPFS. Hawig et al. [39]
propose an architecture based on both MAM channels and
IPFS for the exchange of blood glucose data. Their aim is to
FIGURE 3. System layered architecture.
propose a system that provides immutability, interoperability,
and GDPR compliance.
To the best of our knowledge, the work we propose in this
paper is the first one that combines the usage of both MAM
channels and DFSes, such as IPFS or Sia.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The system architecture that we propose is based on the
aggregation of different distributed technologies that allow
collecting and sharing crowd-sensed and user-managed data.
Smart services enforce the ability of our architecture to obtain
proper, verified data, and to build applications on top of them.
A layered representation of the system architecture is pro-
vided in Figure 3. In particular:
• Data Layer: the first (lowest) layer comprises those
technologies that provide storage and data availability
and reliability through replication, i.e. DLTs and DFSes.
• Validation Layer: the integrity of data, sensed by users
and stored in the data layer, must be guaranteed and
verified. To this aim, the validation layer employs DLTs.
• Transaction Layer: the use of data is authorized only
to entitled users. Access control is performed through
smart contracts and secret sharing techniques.
• Service Layer: access to shared data allows creating
smart services, useful to other users. Needless to say,
data consumers must be confident that data are reliable
and trustful, e.g. data have been generated in a certain
location and measured in proper conditions. Certificates
can grant this trust.
• Presentation Layer: users can interact with the services
in different ways, based on the specific application. This
layer is devoted to implement the interfaces between the
system architecture and the outside world.
The architecture is fundamentally based on data gathered
by sensors placed in vehicles or in users AUs. The user’s
AU, indeed, represents an ITS node controlled by the user
itself, allowing him to share his data and to use smart services:
given its main role, it is placed at the center of the diagram
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FIGURE 4. System architecture.
in Figure 4. This diagram is intended to give a first glance
to the relations in the system and will be further explained in
detail in the following.
A. DATA LAYER
Taking Figure 4 as a reference, and in particular its central
(green) components, we consider vehicle’s internal sensors
(controlled through the OBU) and/or user’s AU, as the main
sources of data sensed in the ITS. Such raw data are then
organized and refined to be stored in the distributed system.
Data can be stored in two different technologies: a DFS or a
DLT. The discriminating factor for the selection of the spe-
cific technology is the data size. Storing data into a DFS
usually requires lower latencies with respect to those that
can be obtained using DLTs. (In fact, DLTs typically require
some time consuming Proof-of-Work.) However, validation
is obtained through the publication of the data (or of the data
digest) into aDLT (seeValidation Layer). Hence, with the aim
of fastening the publication process, we adopt the following
heuristics:
• Data that do have a large-size, higher than a single
sensed value, are stored into a DFS and referenced in
the DLT through their ID, e.g. digest (see blue upper
components in Figure 4).
• Small size files (whose size is comparable to the size
of their digest) are directly stored in the DLTs (yellow
components in the figure).
Once a file is published in the DFS, the returned refer-
ence can be employed to retrieve it in the network. Taking,
for instance, IPFS [9] as the used DFS, such reference is
in fact the data digest itself, that it is stored in the DLT
(Section III-B). Thus, the piece of data is published as an
IPFS object and then (asynchronously) referenced through its
hash into a MAM transaction. The digest allows verifying the
integrity of the IPFS object. To upload files on IPFS, a node
running the IPFS protocol is necessary. Due to the fact that
it is (still) not feasible to run an IPFS node on constrained
devices (such as smartphones or sensors), other solutions
must be explored. For example, in our architecture we assume
that an IPFS service provider (e.g. Infura [64]) lets a user per-
manently store files in the IPFS network, as long as they reach
an agreement (e.g. by paying a subscription). An alternative
solution to reach such agreement can be automated using a
Filecoin smart contract [34].
B. VALIDATION LAYER
One of the aims of the proposed architecture is to give own-
ership of data to the users that produce them, without having
the entire collection of sensed data stored in a centralized data
storage service. DLTs allow avoiding all the typical draw-
backs of server-based approaches (e.g. censorship, single
point of failure), and offer features such as data immutabil-
ity, verifiability and, most importantly, traceability. During
the implementation of the system architecture, we decided
to employ IOTA as DLT. At the time, the rationale behind
this choice was due to its promises in performances and for
the presence of Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM),
a method to handle data that deals with the main requirement
of data privacy.
1) IOTA MASKED AUTHENTICATED MESSAGING (MAM)
As already mentioned, in IOTA the Tangle stores immutable
information that cannot be censored/removed. The Tangle is
a public data ledger, accessible by anyone. Thus, in order to
obfuscate data and make them accessible only to authorized
entities, MAM channels are used to store encrypted data,
providing access only to eligible users.
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Algorithm 1 Publish Data for Validation
Data: t data size threshold, wallet
Input: p data packet
Input: idFC Feature Channel (FC) id
Result: p published in the FC
// wallet is securely accessed from the AU storage
1 kenc, addrFC ← wallet(idFC ) // encryption key and address where to store data in the FC
2 if size(p)> t then
3 penc← encrypt(p, kenc)
4 digest ← storeOnDFS(penc) // returns penc SHA256 digest
5 p← digest
6 end
// start attach to MAM procedure
7 m← createMAMMessage(p, kenc)
8 b← createTangleTXsBundle(addrFC , m) // bundle composed by m and signature TXs
9 τ1, τ2← getTangleTips()
10 b′← POW(b, τ1, τ2)
11 broadcast(b′)
Data gathered from sensors are organized in features, i.e. a
particular kind of data (e.g. a sensed temperature) or a data
point such as geo-location (e.g. the data has been produced
in Copacabana, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil) or vehicle’s velocity.
Two different types of MAM channels are associated to each
user, in which data are stored or referenced:
• Feature Channels - Each feature has its own MAM
channel. A feature channel is, thus, a list of mes-
sages containing data or metadata of the same feature,
arranged in a chronological order. It can be considered
as a continuous log, in which each message has the same
structure and contains the data or a reference (i.e. hash
pointer to an IPFS object) to these data. Since mes-
sages are in chronological order, but with no distinction
between sessions (e.g. all data gathered in one particular
day), and given the fact that a channel could be termi-
nated in favor of a new one (e.g. in case of credentials
loss), a specific kind of channels is needed, in which
messages represent a reference to other messages in fea-
ture channels. For this reason, we introduce the reference
channels.
• Reference Channels - These MAM channels are used
to reference other channels. There are two types of ref-
erence channels, i.e. ‘‘Session’’ channels and ‘‘Index’’
channels. Each ‘‘Session’’ channel records all the ses-
sions related to a given user. For each new session,
a novel message is generated and stored in the user’s
‘‘Session’’ channel. This message contains the reference
to all the active ‘‘Feature’’ channels of this specific
user [17]. The ‘‘Index’’ channel is used to maintain
the hierarchical structure, needed to reference all the
user’s MAM channels. When a new channel is cre-
ated (both ‘‘Session’’ or ‘‘Feature’’), then a new mes-
sage is inserted in the ‘‘Index’’ channel, containing its
reference.
2) PUBLISHING ON IOTA
During the publication of data on IOTA (i.e. validation pro-
cess, Figure 3), a wallet must hold user’s credentials. In our
architecture, the AU manages a wallet, which consists in
a piece of software that securely handles confidential data.
For example, the wallet maintains the private keys used
for signing transactions and managing MAM channels. It is
implemented as a hierarchical deterministic wallet [65].
The data validation process is shown in Algorithm 1.
It mainly consists in retrieving the required keys from the
wallet (line 1), generating the appropriate MAM message in
the form of a bundle of transactions (TXs, lines 7-8) and
executing the process to attach the bundle to the Tangle
(usually performed by a IOTA full node, lines 9-11). More
specifically, MAM channel messages’ payload contains sen-
sor measurements, timestamps and it is represented using
standard notations (e.g. JSON).
C. TRANSACTION LAYER
The transaction layer is devoted to let users share and trade
their data. It is composed of a set of Ethereum smart contracts
and of an Authorization Service, that act as intermediary for
the user. Smart contracts are in charge of granting access to
certain data. The access to a specific datum or a feature chan-
nel, indeed, is purchasable using dedicated smart contract
methods. In Ethereum, such methods are payable functions
that enact monetary transactions. Due to the presence of smart
contracts, no direct interactions are needed among the data
owner and users interested in his data.
1) FEATURES CONTRACTS
Each feature channel in IOTA is associated to a specific
feature contract in Ethereum. Feature contracts allow for
different types of access, each one at an associated crypto-
monetary cost. In essence, the feature contract maintains an
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FIGURE 5. Feature contract represented as a class. Constructor and
get/set methods are omitted.
Access Control List (ACL) that represents the rights to access
the user’s data. This list associates an Ethereum address to a
bundle of data. This bundle is composed of the addresses of
IOTA transactions containing a single datum (or a reference
to an IPFS object), and by references to feature channels.
All the feature smart contracts have the same behaviour.
They are created and instantiated in the Ethereum blockchain
during the user ‘‘registration’’, thanks to the Factory design
pattern. In particular, a Factory contract is used for creating
‘‘child’’ contracts and for storing their addresses, so that they
can be extracted whenever necessary.
Figure 5 shows the class diagram of a Feature contract
with attributes and methods. Attributes include the ACL and
their goal is to provide a sort of ‘‘menu’’, with costs for
accessing data. Whilst, methods are used to convey the access
transaction or to check the access permissions.
2) AUTHORIZATION SERVICE
The authorization service is in charge of enforcing the access
rights that are specified in the Feature contract ACL and
to release the access keys to access data. A data consumer
can send a request to the authorization service, in order to
obtain the secret keys needed to decrypt messages in MAM
Channels and IPFS Objects. Upon user request, the autho-
rization service can check if he is eligible, through interaction
with the smart contract. If this is the case, the authorization
service provides the user with the related access keys. In
particular, for eachMAMmessage and its related IPFS object
(if available), there is a key, which is used to encrypt the
produced data.
The presence of an authentication service is necessary for
two reasons: i) it is unfeasible to assume that every user is
always on to receive access requests; ii) it is not possible that
smart contracts can be autonomous in releasing decryption
keys or decrypting messages, due to the fact that their com-
putation is public.1
There are several methods to design this service. The main
schemes are:
• Client/Server - This is the most feasible solution,
i.e. one server provides the authorization service and
1As a matter of fact, techniques have been proposed to execute private
computation in blockchains, but this is out of the scope of this work [66],
[67]).
holds the entire set of secret keys to access MAM mes-
sages and IPFS objects. The data consumer contacts the
server directly to retrieve the keys he is eligible to get.
This design implies that users trust the server, since this
entity has the complete access to user data.
• Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) - This solution is inspired
to [68], where a single-use, unidirectional and not trans-
parent PRE scheme for secure distributed storage is
described. According to this approach, data blocks are
encrypted using a content key kc and then stored in
a block store together with a lockbox, i.e. the content
key encrypted using a master public key pkm. In our
scenario, the block is the MAM message, while the
Tangle is the block store. When a data consumer wants
to decrypt a block, he asks to the server of an autho-
rization service to access the block through his public
key. If the server has the necessary re-encryption key,
it re-encrypts the lockbox and returns the new ciphertext.
The re-encryption key is generated by the data owner
using the consumer public key. The consumer, then, can
decrypt the re-encrypted lockbox and obtain the key kc.
Since the server is required to be semi-trusted, a variant
based on a consensus network has been proposed by
the authors in [69], [70] for a decentralized scenario.
This PRE solution is expected to have good performance
(for example, with respect to the secret sharing approach
explained below). However, it is achievable only when
the data owner device is able to reply to re-encryption
keys requests. As explained before, we cannot assume
that the users’ devices are always on. Therefore, this
approach is not always suitable in our scenario.
• Secret Sharing - We resort to the Secret Store feature
provided by the Parity Ethereum client [71], a popular
Ethereum blockchain client. The distributed key man-
agement system is built using an overlay of Parity nodes.
In particular, the Secret Store allows users to store frag-
ments of the ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm) key along the overlay. A (t, n)-threshold
scheme is employed. Thus, single nodes alone are unable
to reconstruct an ECDSA key, because they only save
a portion of this key. The retrieval of these fragments,
that constitute the secret key, is controlled through a
specific ‘‘authorization’’ smart contract interface [71].
The Feature contract implements this interface.
All these three techniques are supported in our software archi-
tecture. Due to their characteristics, we claim that ‘‘secret
sharing’’ is the best choice. Such functionality is imple-
mented within the checkPermissions() method of the Feature
contract, shown in Figure 5. This method is called by the
Parity Ethereum nodes during the authorization process [71].
D. SERVICE LAYER
This layer includes all the decentralized ITS services made
available to users. They exploit all the functionalities and data
produced in layers below. Smart services are based on the
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trusted functionalities provided by smart contracts. Services
use crowd-sensed data, whose reliability is founded on the
use of certificates, i.e. proofs on data validity. In this work,
we specifically focus on the authenticity of the geographical
location of the produced data, which is a principal certificate
to be provided in an ITS environment.
1) DATA AUTHENTICITY FOR PROOF OF LOCATION
One of the main concerns, related to the retrieval of crowd-
sensed data, refers to data veracity and accuracy [72]. As a
matter of fact, data is often uncertain, imprecise and difficult
to trust. There is a number of related problems, ranging from
issues related to accuracy, the presence of noise in the data
sensing, up to voluntarily malicious user behavior, such as
data falsification and so on. In this work, we will not deal
with issues concerned with the accuracy of sensors [73].
Rather, we focus on a scheme that ensures that sensed data are
securely added to a decentralized ledger, thus avoiding that an
external entity might tamper such data. Indeed, once added
into a DLT, data cannot be modified, due to the DLTs’ data
immutability features. Thus, the moment when the data can
be altered is in between its generation and its insertion into the
distributed ledger. To cope with this, in this context trust can
be obtained through third party authority and proofs mecha-
nisms. In particular, certificates are used as proofs of a certain
user state property in space and time. Such certificates can be
attached together with data in feature channels. Certificates
are released in a system that can prove to be trusted, e.g. a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and which allows verifying
some intrinsic properties of the produced data, e.g. geospatial
coordinates.
Surely, in a mobility scenario, location covers an important
feature, since it enables the implementation of useful context-
aware services. An example of a proof-of-location certificate,
that might be released in an ITS, is a bus ticket signed by the
bus OBU, i.e. the bus certifies that the owner of the bus ticket
was in that specific bus at a given time, and hence the user was
in a certain geographical position at that time. Thus, the bus
ticket may represent a proof-of-location certification author-
ity, assuming that there is some trust on the bus company and
on the data produced by its buses.
In general, Proof-of-Location (PoL) verifies the correct-
ness of a user’s claim to be in a certain position at a certain
time [74].We consider three ways to provide PoL certificates:
• Use of PKI trust through Certificate Authorities
(CA): any device operating on road (e.g. RSUs or public
transport vehicles) that is trusted by a CA can be then
trusted when releasing certificates. Since communica-
tion, through WiFi or Bluetooth technologies, requires
spacial closeness, a user communicating through these
technologies can issue a claim to this trusted device,
that in turn can answer by releasing a signed certificate
containing the device location. This certificate proves
that the user is in the range of that trusted device, with
an accuracy in the order of tens of metres. A PKI can be
also built in a decentralized environment [75].
• PoL trust through a trustless decentralized system:
FOAM [76] is an example of an open protocol for
decentralized and geospatial data markets in which PoLs
are created using trustless devices. FOAM is a permis-
sionless and autonomous network of radios that offers
secure location services through time synchronization,
independent of centralized sources like GPS. Anyone
can access to the network using his radio, e.g. LoRa,
and he is incentivized by the protocol to cooperate with
other participants in order to provide PoL to other users
by using triangulation methods.
• Zero Knowledge Proof of Location: Zero Knowledge
PoL (zk-PoL) allows a verifier to test whether a position
committed by a prover is inside or outside the radius of
a service area without revealing prover’s exact location.
With respect to the two previous approaches, zk-PoL
introduces the concept of privacy, since it demonstrates
that a user is within a certain area, without revealing the
exact position of the user. Examples of proof-of-location
protocols that enhance location privacy are shown in
Platin [77] and in [27].
2) SMART SERVICES
With the term Smart Services, we refer to services built on
top of the smart contracts presented above (feature contracts)
and possibly novel ones, specifically thought and customized
to support a specific ITS application. An example of smart
service is a mobility tracking system, based on CAM, that can
be used by insurance companies to identify vehicles respon-
sible of road accidents, in order to simplify the resolution
of conflicts [1]. Another use case could be the development
of a public transport monitoring application, based on indi-
viduals’ witnesses (similarly to the scenario we simulate in
Section V).
An important aspect of smart services consists in pay-
ments, that must occur when data are traded among different
parties. We use a standard ERC20 token to perform transac-
tions within the ITS. This token is involved in all ITS related
payments, from data access rights to micropayments. Having
a unique token, used and shared among all ITS services, can
be beneficial for a global use of all the services offered in the
ITS, e.g. a user that receives a token for having shared some
data, then uses it to buy a bus ticket.
We consider two kinds of smart services, based on their
implementation: ‘‘smart contract based services’’ and ‘‘on
road services’’.
a: SMART CONTRACT BASED SERVICES
Users, that are able to provide data or services, can perform
transactions with other users through smart contracts, that are
specifically designed for a given service. The service pay-
ment is accomplished directly on-chain, as soon as contract
methods are called. Service providers can use data provided
by users to acquire knowledge of a particular area. Such data
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foster the development of geo-localized smart services, built
using smart contracts as business logic. Thus, for example,
a user A may be both a data provider and a service consumer,
whereas a user B provides a service by consuming data (that
can be generated by users like A). User B gains access rights
to some data through feature contracts owned by user like A
and then offers a service based on that data to A. Such service
might be offered in exchange of a payment; the payment will
be accomplished through a transaction, issued to a specific
smart contract related to the service and owned by B.
b: ON ROAD (DIRECT COMMUNICATION) SERVICES
On road services are direct communication services operated
by devices/vehicles in the ITS. These services exploit V2X
connections, where ‘‘X’’ indicates a device that is capable of
offering Smart Services and the connection happens through
short range communications. These services aremainly based
on micropayments. Examples are:
• Parking and bus tickets - micropayments are exchanged
through a NFC communication channel with the ending
device.
• Limited traffic area and motorway tolls payments -
messages are exchanged through WiFi Direct passing
through gates.
• Pay-per-drive - pay-per-use car rental services, made
possible through communication between the AU and
the vehicle’s OBU, based on the traveled distance.
To foster the implementation of such services, we imple-
mented a micropayment channel network, based on the
µRaiden framework [22], [23]. µRaiden is an open source
framework, used to implement ERC20-based free pay-per-
use payment channels on top of the Raiden Network. The
rationale behind this choice is that it is not feasible to open
a novel payment channel, every time a user interacts with
an on road service. To avoid this, Raiden Network allows
creating an overlay network of payment channels. Thus, if,
for instance, a user A has an opened channel with user B, and
B has an open channel with C, then A can pay C through B,
without having to open a novel payment channel between A
and C.
IV. A SYSTEM USE CASE TOWARDS A DATA TRADING
AND PRIVACY
Data in ITS are usually shared among many independent and
self-interested participants, each of them giving a specific
value to such data and then leading to the creation of a
data marketplace. The data marketplace we envision [78]
allows connecting data providers and consumers, ensuring
data high quality, consistency and security. Data providers are
recognized as owners in the marketplace and receive benefits
(mostly economical) in exchange of the datasets and data
streams they supply. Consumers pay for data they acquire
and may provide new information back to the marketplace,
in return. Smart contracts (e.g. feature contracts) can auto-
FIGURE 6. Sensing-as-a-Service in a data marketplace.
mate the negotiation among data providers and consumers,
providing advantages for both parties.
Clearly enough, such service must guarantee privacy, when
needed, in order to avoid the disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion.
A. SMART SERVICE: ANONYMIZING DATA BY
AGGREGATION
In the marketplace, data providers maintain their data,
as described in the previous sections, and register data they
want to sell, alongwith standardised descriptions of what they
measure, i.e. ontologies. (In this work, we will not go into
the details of aspects related to data description, giving more
focus on the system architecture.) Such data, coming from
different sources, can be aggregated to provide anonymized
datasets, that might be more valuable than single data points.
Figure 6 shows an example of how such Sensing-as-a-
Service can be implemented [79]–[81]. An entity takes the
role of data processor, standing between providers and con-
sumers: such ‘‘aggregator’’ gathers data from individual data
providers and produces anonymized aggregated data, ready
to be acquired by consumers. The main steps of this process
are as follows:
• Data providers release data measured in the ITS to the
aggregator, by granting the access on the related Feature
contracts. An Aggregation contract regulates policies,
rights and obligations of both aggregators and providers.
Hence, by invoking the contract’s functions, all partici-
pants agree to these policies.
• The aggregator selects k providers, among those avail-
able, using the quality of the data as the discriminant, i.e.
Proof of Sensing [78]. These providers becomemembers
of a k-DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organiza-
tion [82]) created to limit possible aggregator’s mali-
cious behaviors. The aggregator, indeed, stakes a safety
deposit, and the k-DAO at any moment can decide to
vote (through the smart contract) to redeem this deposit,
if the aggregator misbehaves.
• Finally, data is aggregated in a dataset that presents prop-
erties of k-anonymity [83] and differential privacy [84].
This dataset can then be acquired by data consumers in
a process where every participant is rightfully rewarded
(directly though a contract method).
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This service is specifically thought to protect the privacy
of data providers and to produce anonymized data. Not only,
it also provides some advantages in a data marketplace. For
instance, through this approach the consumer can gather large
quantities of the same kind of data, rather than searching
single providers, one by one. Similarly, data aggregation is
an advantage also for the data sellers, since they have more
chances to sell their data in an aggregate form.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The aim of this section is to assess the performance and
scalability of the proposed system. This system is expected
to attend a large number of clients that publish data to be
used for smart services or to constitute a marketplace. In this
sense, surely, the most critical part of the system architecture
is on the use of DLTs, i.e. Data and Validation layers of
Figure 3. In particular, we are interested in evaluating the
goodness of adopting IOTA as the immutable registry for
ITS, as well as the DFS solutions. Thus, we focused on the
transmission of sensed data to the system presented above,
measuring latencies needed to issue, insert and validate mes-
sages/transactions (TXs), and also the level of reliability of
the network nodes.
A. SETUP: TRACE-DRIVEN VEHICLES SIMULATION
Our experimental scenario was based on a hypothetical real
ITS application. In particular, we conducted a trace-driven
experimental evaluation. Traces were generated using the
RioBuses dataset, a real dataset of mobility traces of buses in
Rio de Janeiro (Brasil) [85]. Based on these traces, we sim-
ulated a number of buses that, during their path, periodically
generate sensed data. These data may represent temperatures,
air pollution values, etc. Here, we are mainly interested in the
behaviour of the system, hence we focus only in one type
of datum, i.e. the bus geolocation (latitude and longitude).
We assume that the time spent to fetch such data is negligible,
with respect to the time to publish it. Figure 7 shows the paths
of 10 buses, as an example, that were considered during our
tests.
These messages were utilized to generate real requests
transmitted to both the DLT and the chosen DFS. Each mes-
sage was sent to a given node of the networks.
• DLT tests: we mainly focused on IOTA node selection
(next subsection) and on its scalability. We varied the
number of buses in the range: 60, 120, 240. For each bus,
we utilized one hour of trace data. Based on the paths,
each bus was set to generate approximately 45 mes-
sage/hour. Thus, we made one hour long tests, where
each bus generated, on average, a message to be issued
to the DLT every 80 sec, which is a reasonable time
interval to sense data in an urban scenario. For each test
configuration, we replicated the experiment 12 times.
• DFS tests: we compared two DFSes solutions: IPFS and
Sia [20]. The idea is to study the solutions to store data
in a DFS, comparing the latencies to request IPFS nodes
FIGURE 7. The 1 hour long path of 10 buses in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).
and Sia nodes. In the case of IPFS, we assessed two
different scenarios: i) the case with a dedicated IPFS
node, devoted to handle only requests coming from our
application (referred as ‘‘IPFS Private’’), ii) the case
with a public IPFS node, that can be contacted also by
other applications (referred as ‘‘IPFS Public’’). In the
case of Sia, we exploited the Skynet platform services
[86] to easily access the provided permanent storage.
A limitation of these assessments was the usage of a
single DFS node. Thus, in order to keep a comparable
workload between the DFS and the DLT tests, the num-
ber of buses was set equal to 10, i.e. 10 bus for each node
on average (Section V-B3).
For each request, we recorded the outcome, i.e. success-
ful or unsuccessful, due to some nodes internal error, as well
as the latency between the transmission of the request (a TX
in the case of IOTA) and the confirmation of the data being
published in the network.
1) IOTA SETUP
Each bus was emulated by a single process (issuing messages
based on the data trace). Thus, the first task was to find, for
each bus, a full node of the IOTA DLT to interact with. In our
tests, we were enabled to rely only on services that maintain a
public list of active nodes [87]. This is because IOTA network
full nodes do not usually allow to list their neighbors in the
P2P overlay, through API. Hence, it is not possible to perform
an in-depth graph search on the overlay and to retrieve an up-
to-date list of active nodes to interact with. With this in view,
the scheme we designed, to select the IOTA nodes to contact,
is as follows. Given the list of public nodes, a filter is applied
to keep only nodes that are fully synchronized, i.e. the node
has solidified all the milestones up to the latest one released
by the coordinator, and that allows remote PoW. During our
tests, these IOTA nodes were ∼ 60. Then, we designed three
heuristics for the selection of a full node from the public pool:
1) Fixed Random: Each bus is assigned to a random
IOTA full node from the pool, during the setup phase;
then, every TX generated by that bus is handled by this
node, for the whole duration of the test.
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2) Dynamic Random: A random node from the pool is
selected every time a message has to be published by a
bus.
3) Adaptive RTT: For each bus, its associated node
actively changes every time a message has to be pub-
lished, while the previous one is still pending. Based
on results of past interactions, the known IOTA nodes
are ranked through the experienced Round Trip Time
(RTT) [88]. Then, a new node is chosen by selecting
the best known node or, if every known node is in the
process of publishing a message, a new node is picked
randomly from the pool.
We used a MAM channel associated to each single bus.
The procedure followed is shown in the algorithm in section
III-B2 (in particular, lines 7-11). It is worth noticing that the
use of a MAM channel significantly increases the latencies
to add a TX in the ledger, with respect to single messages.
In fact, each message to be published in the MAM channel
requires three TXs to be issued, i.e. one containing the data
and two other messages for the signature. The creation of
such bundle of TXs requires, on average, 1475 msec using
a smartphone considered as the AU (Qualcomm Snapdragon
625 MSM8953 CPU), while 224 msec using a server (Intel
Core i7-6700HQ CPU).2 However, after the creation of a
message, during the communication with the provider the two
hardware configurations were not different in performance;
therefore, all the reported measurements are based on the
server setup.
The use of a MAM channel for each bus has the advantage
to permit a fast and easy retrieval of each bus’s data stream.
For each TX, we measured the time required to perform the
tip selection, as well as the PoW. The tip selection depth
parameter, i.e. the number of milestones to go back to start
the random walk to select tips, was set to 3, whilst the
minimum weight magnitude, i.e. the number of trailing zeros
of a TX hash, was 14 (minimum standard value for the IOTA
mainnet).
2) IPFS & SIA SETUP
As well as in the IOTA tests, the same data-driven simulation
was employed to simulate the buses’ behavior. However,
in this case, each process (modelling a bus) interacts with only
one node, which can be of 3 types:
• IPFS Private Node: We setup an IPFS node on a dedi-
cated device, connected to other nodes in the main net-
work. Thus, the host simulating the buses was the only
one sending requests to it. The files are stored locally
(and on its IPFS neighbors) and as long as someone
is incentivized to ‘‘pin’’ it, i.e. to keep it, it remains
available to anyone.
• IPFS Public Node: The previous case requires that
every user maintains a proprietary IPFS node. Actually,
it is more reasonable for users to rely on a service
2We think that performances on smartphones can be further enhanced,
since the used libraries for MAM channels were not native.
FIGURE 8. Latency comparison between two IOTA full nodes attaching
simultaneously a sequence of 100 TXs.
provider. With this in view, we tested the Infura service
[64], that offers a free access to IPFS.
• SiaNode: Tests are conductedmaking requests to a node
in the Skynet, a content delivery platform built on top of
Sia. A Skynet node (webportal) is a special Sia node that
has already formed contracts with every available host,
paying for the files uploaded to them, and thus proposing
a service with its own policies on how many and what
types of files you can upload [86]. The estimated price
for storing files in Sia is reasonably low, i.e. around $2/
TB/month (when the network is fully optimized) [89].
Tests consist in measuring the latency to successfully com-
plete a message upload. To foster the reproducibility of our
experiments, the entire dataset (comprehending IOTA, IPFS
and Sia) and the implemented scripts are made available in a
public github repository [90] with a Free Software license.
B. RESULTS: IOTA
1) NODES PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCE
A first important result to mention is the wide difference on
the performance of different IOTA full nodes. As an example,
Figure 8 shows latencies we measured using two exemplars
IOTA full nodes. As the figure shows, there is a significant
difference on the times required to perform the same task.
This is probably caused by the different nodes’ hardware
capabilities, as well as the possibly different workload they
were subjected to, during the tests. In fact, IOTA full nodes
are not homogeneous, nor there is some kind of load balanc-
ing mechanism that coordinates the requests received from
users. Not only, it is important to point out that a node with
a higher network degree may receive more TXs from others;
therefore, it is faster to provide tips to clients.
In particular, this test consists in attaching 100 TXs to the
Tangle, but Full Node 1 is relatively ‘‘unknown’’, while Full
Node 2 is one of the most used nodes that operate in IOTA.
This means that Full Node 1 has more resources to provide
to clients but less tips, since it receives less TXs, while Full
Node 2 is faster in providing tips but it has a limited amount
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FIGURE 9. 60 bus tests: average latencies, standard deviation and errors for the three different schemes (lower is better).
of resources to devote to each client. The result is that Full
Node 2 allows to attach a TX in 9 seconds on average, while
Full Node 1 needs more that 30 seconds.
These preliminary results demonstrate that the choice of
the used full nodes is relevant. In the rest of the section,
we show results related to the different heuristics, employed
to select the IOTA full nodes.
2) NODE SELECTION
Figure 9 shows results obtained for different test repetitions,
when the number of emulated buses was set to 60. In par-
ticular, we show the results for each scheme we employed
for the selection of the nodes. In the upper part, the bar
charts report the average latencies measured during a single
test. The orange (lighter) part of the bar chart shows the
average latency to perform the tip selection, while the blue
(darker) part shows the average latency associated to the PoW.
The red (central and smaller) bars refer to the percentage of
errors (the related y-axis is shown on the right of the figure),
i.e. amount of TXs that failed to be added to the Tangle,
due to full nodes’ errors. On the lower part of the figure,
we show the average standard deviations related the specific
tests, both for the tip selection and PoW. From the figure,
it is possible to appreciate how in general a random selection
of the full node to issue a TX does not lead to good results.
The amount of errors is quite high, as well as the measured
latencies. Thus, these tests seem to conclude that, at the time
of writing, the IOTA DLT is not fully structured to support
smart services for transportation systems. On the other hand,
the good news is that if we carefully select the full node to
issue a TX, the performances definitely improve. In fact, our
third scheme ‘‘Adaptive RTT’’ has a low amount of errors,
on average around 0.8%. Measured latencies are lower than
other approaches because well performing nodes are chosen
more often. Still, the average latency amounts to 23 seconds,
which is far from a real-time update of the DLT. The level of
FIGURE 10. Latency (in log scale): boxplots for tests with 60, 120,
240 buses.
acceptability of latency values truly depends on the applica-
tion scenario.
These first results suggest that some scalability tests might
give further insights on the viability of the use of IOTA as the
DLT to support smart transportation system. For this reason,
we made some tests with an increasing number of buses.
3) DLT SCALABILITY
Figure 10 shows average results obtained using our three con-
sidered schemes, when varying the number of buses. Results
are reported as box plots. Thus, each box plot corresponds
to the average results for a scheme in a given scenario. This
allows to assess the scalability of each scheme, by looking
at the results for an increasing amount of buses. At the same
time, it is possible to compare the three schemes by looking
at their performance for each scenario.
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FIGURE 11. Average latencies increasing the number of buses.
The rectangle identifies the Inter-Quartile Range (IQR),
i.e. values from the 25th to the 75th percentile, representing
themiddle 50%of values. Hence, the lower part of the box (let
denote it Q1) is the first quartile (25th percentile), the highest
(denote it Q3) is the third quartile (75th percentile). The red
line inside the box is the median value. The lower and upper
values identified by the vertical line are the whiskers. In box
plots, the whiskers are defined as 1.5 times the IQR. Thus,
the lower whisker is Q1 - 1.5*IQR, while the upper whisker is
Q3+ 1.5*IQR; they represent a common way to describe the
dispersion of the data. Finally, the ‘‘×’’ symbols outside the
whiskers are the outliers. To better show the obtained results,
the y-axis is reported in a log scale.
Results show that in all cases, average latencies increase
significantly with the number of buses. It is worth noticing
that, being the y-axis in log scale, the difference on the perfor-
mance is relevant. It is also confirmed that ‘‘Adaptive RTT’’
provides better results since average latencies are definitely
lower than other schemes. In particular, the first two schemes
have outliers well over 103 sec. This suggests that the number
of full nodes devoted to the TX management should increase
proportionally to the number of buses.
A set of issued TXs is handled by each node sequentially,
i.e. one after the other. Thus, a delay occurred in a TX have
repercussions on subsequent ones, in terms of latency to add
TXs in the DLT. For instance, when 240 buses are active and
send requests, we have a message generation rate of about
∼ 3 msg/sec, to be issued to the IOTA DLT. If we assume
that the workload is evenly distributed among 60 nodes, then,
each node handles TXs from about 4 buses, thus receiving,
on average, a new TX request every ∼ 20 sec. Bearing in
mind that, at best, it takes 23 sec for a full node to process
a TX, then we see that an initial overhead of a few seconds
leads to a huge increase at the end of the test. It is worth
noticing, however, that in ‘‘Adaptive RTT’’, the same ∼ 15
full nodes were utilized (as they performed better than the
others), with an average workload of 16 buses per node,
which means a new request every 5 sec. For this reason,
FIGURE 12. Empirical cumulative distribution function for tests with
120 and 240 buses.
the latency increased to 73.26 sec on average. This means that
further improvements are needed to solve scalability issues.
To better emphasize the outcomes, Table 1 reports some
summarized statistics (shown in the box plots) and the error
rates. Actually, the studied approaches show a great differ-
ence in the amount of errors. While the average error for
‘‘Adaptive RTT’’ is ∼ 1%, for the other two schemes we
have errors well above 15%. These error rates are clearly
unacceptable, meaning that these approaches are unusable in
real ITS scenarios.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the empirical cumulative distri-
bution function obtained for the compared schemes in the
120 and 240 bus scenarios. In this case, for the sake of a better
visualization, the x-axis is in log-scale. These charts further
confirm the better performance obtained by the ‘‘Adaptive
RTT’’ scheme.
4) ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: LOCAL PoW
In this section, we evaluate an alternative approach, which
consists in adopting an edge computing system model. In this
case, the PoW is executed by the gateway of the edge com-
puting system, e.g. an RSU. (The tip selection must be always
accomplished at a full node, that maintains a complete copy
of the Tangle.) The rationale would be to relieve the IOTA
node from the computational burden of the PoW. However,
this would force to equip the gateway with sufficient com-
putational capabilities to perform the PoW for all the TXs
generated by the buses it handles.
We made some tests using a host, as the gateway, equipped
with a NVIDIA GTX 950 GPU (the PoW algorithm is exe-
cuted onGPUs). The host was in charge of handlingmessages
generated from a different amounts of buses, i.e. 1, 5, 10
buses. Table 2 shows the average times needed to perform
the PoW at the gateway for 1, 5 or 10 buses (these latencies
are related to the actual time required to perform the PoW),
and compared to results obtainedwith a public IOTA full node
for 10 buses (in this case, the latency includes the RTT for the
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TABLE 1. Results on IOTA, with 60, 120, 240 buses.
TABLE 2. Comparison between PoW performed at the gateway (local)
and by delegating a IOTA public node.
communication with the full node). In this case, results show
that a public node is definitely faster (when it is well chosen).
This means that adequate hardware nodes are needed, and this
results in a trade-off that must be considered in a compre-
hensive cost/benefit evaluation. The more computationally
efficient these nodes are, the more they will be able to handle
PoW requests coming from vehicles. Similarly, the higher
the density of these gateways in a given geographical area,
the lower their workload. Thus, in the design of an edge
computing platform, the optimal placement of these gateways
should be made carefully, based on their hardware character-
istics.
C. RESULTS: IPFS & SIA
In this section, we show results for the tests with the DFS. The
box plots in Figure 13 show the average results obtainedwhen
making requests to the IPFS Private node, the IPFS Public
Infura node and the Sia node. These results relate to messages
generated from 10 buses.
Results show that the difference on the performance is
relevant between the private case and the public ones. This
was expected, since the private node processes only requests
coming from the buses, while the other two nodes receive
multiple requests from other unknown clients simultaneously.
IPFS Private has a mean latency of about 1 sec, with a very
limited standard deviation. We experienced some outliers
in the latencies, that nevertheless where all below 9 sec.
Conversely, IPFS Public and Sia do have a wide latency
dispersion. Even if the Skynet-Sia node has volatile perfor-
mances, on average it performs better than the Infura-IPFS
one. In both cases, the latency outliers reach values above 18
sec. In particular, in the chart we limited the y-axis to 18 sec.
However, in some cases we measured latencies above 41 sec
for IPFS Public, and 25 sec for Sia.
FIGURE 13. Latency: boxplots for tests in IPFS and Sia. (Limited at 18 sec
for clarity).
TABLE 3. Results on DFS.
As already mentioned, we had a limited access to the
DFS nodes. This limited our tests to the use of a single
node that handles the buses requests. This in turn limited the
amount of buses requests and, in order to keep the requests
associated to each node comparable to those of DLTs tests,
we kept the amount of buses equal to 10. Results show that,
as expected, DFSes are definitely faster than DLTs, since
there are no issues concerned with tip selection and PoW.
But, of course, their role in the ITS ecosystem is different.
DFSes only maintain data, and they can be utilized to provide
data availability and reliability guarantees, while DLTs pro-
vide immutability guarantees. Thus, these two technologies
must be provided in conjunction (as we do in our system
architecture).
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VI. DISCUSSION
As already mentioned in the previous section, results on the
employedDFSes show good performance. The latenciesmea-
sured to add data into IPFS and Sia are practically acceptable
in ITS scenarios. Clearly enough, an adequate ITS infrastruc-
ture must be set, in order to build a scalable architecture that
is able to properly handle a possibly high data generation rate
from multiple moving vehicles. Put in other words, we think
that the issue is concerned more on the system deployment,
rather than on the DFS protocol. For instance, an edge com-
puting architecture can be used to geographically place DFS
node gateways, which receive data from vehicles and insert
them into the DFS.
On the other hand, our results show that the design of
effective, responsive and reliable DLTs is a crucial aspect.
For instance, if IOTA is chosen as the DLT for storing data,
then it is important to properly select the IOTA nodes to
interact with, in order to get error rates that are acceptable.
However, measured latencies resulted higher than 20 sec,
which is quite high if we think at real-time applications,
but reasonable for less time demanding services. Regardless
of the proper selection of the faster full node, an impor-
tant part of the time required for the validation of trans-
actions is due to the execution of the PoW. This time can
be lowered by asking to a computationally efficient node
to perform this task. However, it cannot be eliminated,
in IOTA.
With this in view, it is important to mention that we
conducted preliminary tests with other possible DLTs, that
implement novel techniques to improve responsiveness and
scalability. Among the others, a solution worth of mention
is Radix, a novel DLT that implements sharding techniques
[91]. In few words, sharding consists in breaking the ledger
into smaller, more manageable chunks, and distributing those
chunks across multiple nodes, in order to spread the load and
maintain a high throughput. At the time of writing, the Radix
technology is still in its infancy and a proper main net does
not exist, yet. Nevertheless, we exploited the alphanet test
network to issue transactions on the ledger. Thus, obtained
results cannot be considered accurate and it is too early to
give an overall judgment on this DLT. However, we obtained
very low latencies (below 1 sec), with a non negligible (but
low) error rate. We stress the fact that these results cannot
be compared with those obtained for IOTA. In fact, in IOTA
we exploited the main net, while in Radix we had to employ
a preliminary testnet, with few nodes involved to the ledger
management (∼ 6 nodes) and basically no additional work-
load, apart from our tests. As a matter of fact, comparable
results can be obtained if tests are executed on the IOTA test
net, where the PoW is faster (we obtained average latencies
around ∼ 2 sec).
To conclude this discussion, we mention that, even if there
are some novel interesting proposals to improve the scalabil-
ity of DLTs, such as sharding or the Ethereum plasma [92],
amain problem refers to the high fees that are often associated
to every transaction. In fact, IOTA is designed to be feeless.
Conversely, Radix and Ethereum are based on fees. These
costs may be acceptable only when the transaction fees are
negligible with respect to the value of the data.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a system architecture that is able to
manage and exploit crowd-sensed data in the novel generation
of ITS, to foster the development of novel smart and intelli-
gent transportation services. Our architecture exploits DLTs
and DFSes, to conveniently store and secure data. Moreover,
certificates, such as Proof of Location, allow to authenticate
such data. Ethereum smart contracts and a distributed key
management system are employed to control data access and
authorization.
Experiences with the implemented software architecture
allowed us to conclude that the use of DLTs, together with
DFS and sophisticated cryptographic schemes, permits to
viably control data access and to offer interesting services,
while maintaining data authenticity and availability. We have
shown the case of a data marketplace, as an application
example.
We claim that an important and critical outcome of this
work is concerned with the experimental assessment we per-
formed, and the related results of the current technologies
available at the moment. Latencies measured to store data
into the considered DFSes, i.e. IPFS and Sia, can be consid-
ered acceptable for general ITS scenarios. As concerns the
employed DLT, i.e. IOTA, we conclude that at the moment
the obtained results are not viable for real-time applications,
but acceptable for less demanding services.
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